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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Shaun Chapman appeals the District Court’s 
application of the career offender enhancement to his 
sentence calculation under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”).  Chapman contends that his 
convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) do not qualify as 
crimes of violence.  This appeal requires us to determine 
whether § 876(c)—which proscribes mailing a 
3 
 
communication containing a threat to injure the person of the 
addressee or of another —is a crime of violence, as defined 
by the Guidelines.  Because we agree with the District Court 
that Chapman’s convictions are crimes of violence within the 
meaning of the Guidelines, we will affirm. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
 A. Factual Background 
 While serving a sentence in state prison in 2006, 
Chapman wrote a letter—eventually intercepted by prison 
staff—threatening to kill President George W. Bush.  Shortly 
after, in an interview with Secret Service agents, Chapman 
admitted that he wanted to kill the President and went on to 
make additional threats.  A few months later, a federal grand 
jury returned an indictment charging Chapman with 
threatening the President, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).  
Chapman pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months’ 
imprisonment. 
 In 2007, shortly after his sentencing, Chapman mailed 
a letter to a federal district court judge, which contained 
threats against the judge and other court staff.  This time, a 
federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Chapman 
with mailing a threatening communication, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 876(c).  Chapman was sentenced to an additional 48 
months’ imprisonment.   
 Chapman was released from federal custody in April 
2014.  Soon after, he violated the terms of his supervised 
release and received a sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment.  
While serving this sentence, Chapman mailed a letter to the 
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U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  The letter contained threats against the federal 
prosecutor who handled Chapman’s revocation proceedings, 
as well as the probation officer involved with Chapman’s 
case.  These actions put Chapman in his current predicament. 
 B. Procedural History 
 In May 2015, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment on one count of mailing a threatening 
communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).  Chapman 
pled guilty to the one count, without a plea agreement.   
 At the March 2016 sentencing hearing, the District 
Court considered Chapman’s presentence investigation report 
(“PSR”).  Based on the PSR, the government recommended 
that Chapman receive the career offender enhancement 
because his “instant offense of conviction [was] a felony that 
is . . . a crime of violence” and he “ha[d] at least two prior 
felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence.”  U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2017) [hereinafter Guidelines Manual].  The 
government also noted that other circuits had adopted the 
same position as to § 876(c).  Meanwhile, Chapman argued 
that § 876(c) is not a crime of violence because it does not 
require “violent physical force,” and therefore it does not 
“have as an element the use, attempted use, or threaten[ed] 
use of force.”  App. 49–52.  
 The District Court rejected Chapman’s argument and 
concluded that a conviction under § 876(c) is a crime of 
violence.  The District Court noted that the “express language 
and the semantic structure of [§] 876(c) refute[d]” Chapman’s 
argument.  App. 53.  Applying the career offender 
5 
 
enhancement, the District Court sentenced Chapman to 70 
months’ imprisonment, which is at the bottom of the 
Guidelines range.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Whether a . . . 
conviction constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the 
career offender Guideline is a question of law over which we 
exercise plenary review.”  United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 
185, 188 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 Chapman argues that his conviction here and a 
previous conviction do not qualify as crimes of violence 
under the Guidelines.  We disagree.1 
                                                 
 1 The thrust of Chapman’s argument focuses on 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) is a crime of violence; whether 18 
U.S.C. § 871(a)—which punishes mailing “any threat to take 
the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the 
President of the United States”—is a crime of violence is left 
to a footnote.  Appellant’s Br. at 9 n.5 (abstaining from 
discussion of whether § 871(a) is a crime of violence but 
noting that the § 876(c) analysis “would seem to apply”); see 
also Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Chapman, 
No. 15-cr-094 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2016), ECF No. 55 at 6 n.3.  
We agree that the analysis is the same, and will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s holding that a violation of § 871(a) 
is a crime of violence.  See United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 
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 Under the Guidelines, one is designated a career 
offender if: 
(1) [he] was at least eighteen years old at the 
time [he] committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction 
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense; and (3) [he] has at 
least two prior felony convictions of either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense. 
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a).  Both the instant conviction 
and the previous conviction at issue here were for violating 
18 U.S.C. § 876(c), which prohibits mailing “any threat to 
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the 
addressee or of another.”   
 To determine whether Chapman’s convictions under 
§ 876(c) could serve as career offender predicate offenses, we 
will first examine the definition of “crime of violence,” as 
defined by Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(1).  Then, we will compare 
this definition to the elements of the statute forming the basis 
of Chapman’s convictions. 
                                                                                                             
16, 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that § 871(a) “has as an 
element the [] threatened use of physical force against another 
person” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. 
McCaleb, 908 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1990) (“No semantical 
contrivance can avoid the simple conclusion that the conduct 
involved in [§ 871(a)] is . . . the ‘threatened use of physical 
force against the person [] of another.’”). 
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A. Definition of “Crime of Violence,” Pursuant 
 to the Career Offender Enhancement 
 The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as “any 
offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another.”  Guidelines 
Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1).2  It bears discussing the meaning of 
“use” and “physical force.” 
 The word “use” means “the intentional employment of 
. . . force, generally to obtain some end.”  Tran v. Gonzales, 
414 F.3d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 2005).  “[T]he word ‘use’ conveys 
the idea that the thing used . . . has been made the user’s 
instrument.”  United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 
1415 (2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Turning to “physical force,” the Supreme Court has 
defined this phrase to mean “violent force,” in other words, 
“force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another 
person.”  Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 
(2010).3  It is important to note that the use of physical force 
                                                 
 2 Chapman does not dispute that he was convicted of 
offenses that are punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year. 
 3 Although Johnson involved a sentencing 
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e), rather than the career offender Guideline, 
Johnson still binds our analysis.  United States v. Hopkins, 
577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he definition of a 
violent felony under the ACCA is sufficiently similar to the 
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does not require that the person employing force directly 
apply harm to—i.e., strike—the victim.  We derive this 
principle from United States v. Castleman, where the 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that knowingly or 
intentionally poisoning another person does not constitute a 
use of force: 
The “use of force” in [Respondent’s] example is 
not the act of “sprinkl[ing]” the poison; it is the 
act of employing poison knowingly as a device 
to cause physical harm.  That the harm occurs 
indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or 
punch), does not matter.  Under [Respondent’s] 
logic, after all, one could say that pulling the 
trigger on a gun is not a “use of force” because 
it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually 
strikes the victim. 
134 S. Ct. at 1415.   
 We understand that the Court in Castleman applied the 
common-law definition of “force”—which is satisfied by 
offensive touching—to the meaning of “physical force,” as 
used in “misdemeanor crime of violence,” and the sentencing 
enhancement in this case requires us to analyze the meaning 
of “physical force,” as used in felony “crime of violence.”  
Chapman argues that Castleman lacks persuasive value for 
this reason. 
                                                                                                             
definition of a crime of violence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines [so] that authority interpreting one is generally 
applied to the other . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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 But Chapman fails to sufficiently explain why 
Castleman’s analysis should not apply here.  If employing a 
device to cause harm indirectly (e.g., pulling the trigger on a 
gun) meets the definition of “physical force,” as used in 
misdemeanor crime of violence, then it stands to reason that 
the same action meets the definition of “physical force,” as 
used in felony crime of violence.  Otherwise, § 4B1.1(a)(1) 
would only apply to offenses that explicitly require a punch, 
kick, or some other form of touching that is more than 
offensive.  We therefore find that the “use” of “physical 
force,” as used in § 4B1.2(a)(1), involves the intentional 
employment of something capable of causing physical pain or 
injury to another person, regardless of whether the perpetrator 
struck the victim’s body.4 
                                                 
 4 A number of other circuits have similarly extended 
Castleman’s analysis to apply to felony “crime of violence,” 
as used in the ACCA, Guidelines § 4B1.2, and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(3).  See United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878 
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2201 (2017) (holding that a 
statute punishing battery—which has as part of an element 
“causes physical injury”—is a crime of violence); United 
States v. Redrick, 841 F.3d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2204 (2017) (holding that robbery with a 
deadly weapon—even if the weapon was “poison,” an “open 
flame,” or “lethal bacteria”—is a crime of violence); United 
States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding 
that Hobbs Act robbery—which is accomplished by means of 
putting the victim in “fear of injury”—is a crime of violence); 
United States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 569 (2016) (holding that a statute 
punishing domestic battery—which has as part of an element 
10 
 
B. The Framework for Comparing Chapman’s 
 Convictions to the Definition of “Crime of 
 Violence” 
 To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime 
of violence, courts use the categorical approach, which calls 
for a comparison of “the elements of the statute forming the 
basis of the defendant’s conviction” with the definition of 
crime of violence.  Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2276, 2281 (2013).  Under this approach, we “‘look only to 
the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a 
defendant’s prior offense[], and not ‘to the particular facts 
underlying th[e] conviction[].’”  Id. at 2283 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 
(1990)).   
 In the context of determining whether a conviction is a 
crime of violence, as defined by § 4B1.2(a)(1), we ask 
whether “the use or threat of physical force [against the 
person of another]” is an element of the offense.  Brown, 765 
F.3d at 189 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  If the statute has this element, or “defines the crime 
                                                                                                             
“causes bodily harm”—is a crime of violence); but see United 
States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 156 n.10 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 164 (2016) (observing that Castleman does 
not “abrogate[] the distinction . . . between the use of force 
and the causation of injury”); Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 
471 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that a statute punishing assault—
which has as part of an element “causes [physical] injury”—is 
not a crime of violence); United States v. Gatson, 776 F.3d 
405, 411 (6th Cir. 2015) (limiting the holding of Castleman to 
the context of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”). 
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more narrowly,” then the conviction can serve as a predicate 
offense.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283.  But if the 
“statute sweeps more broadly than the [Guidelines-defined 
crime of violence], a conviction under [that statute] is not a 
career offender predicate even if the defendant actually 
committed the offense in a way that involved the use (or 
threatened use) of physical force against another.”  Brown, 
765 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Before we launch into the necessary comparison, there 
is an additional step to take because the statute that formed 
Chapman’s convictions, 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), is a divisible 
statute, meaning it “comprises multiple, alternative versions 
of the crime.”  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284.5  Those 
versions are: (1) knowingly mailing any communication 
containing any threat to kidnap any person; and (2) 
knowingly mailing any communication containing any threat 
to injure the person of the addressee or of another.  To 
determine which version was the basis of Chapman’s 
convictions, we can consider “the statutory definition, 
charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea 
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to 
which the defendant assented”—this is known as the 
modified categorical approach.  Shepard v. United States, 544 
U.S. 13, 16 (2005).    
                                                 
 5 On the other hand, a statute is indivisible if it sets out 
a single set of elements to define a single crime.  Mathis v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016).  An example 
of an indivisible statute:  a statute that criminalizes “the entry 
of a premises with the intent to steal.”  By contrast, that 
statute would be divisible if “entry” is swapped with “lawful 
entry, or in the alternative, unlawful entry.” 
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 Here, the indictment charged Chapman with mailing a 
communication containing threats “to injure” two individuals, 
so we turn toward the threat to injure version of § 876(c).6  
This version has two elements:  (1) the defendant knowingly 
mailed a threatening communication; and (2) the 
communication contained a threat to injure the person of the 
addressee or another. 
C. Comparing the “Threat to Injure” Version 
of  § 876(c) to the Definition of “Crime of 
 Violence” 
 Next, we examine the element “threat to injure the 
person of the addressee or of another.”  At the outset, it is 
worth mentioning that the plain language of this element 
closely tracks Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s requirement of 
“threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.”  Dictionaries support this point.  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary defines “injure” as “to inflict 
bodily hurt on.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1164 (1993).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“injure” as “[t]o do harm to, damage, or impair.  To hurt or 
wound, as the person.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 785 (6th ed. 
1990).  And “person,” when followed by “of the addressee or 
                                                 
 6 Our application of the modified categorical approach 
does not conflict with our holding in United States v. Muniz, 
637 F. App’x 65 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished opinion).  
There, a panel of this Court addressed whether the “threat to 
injure” version of § 876(c) was divisible by its mens rea, 
concluding that it was not.  Id. at 68.  Thus, Muniz did not 
address whether § 876(c) is divisible because it provides for 
two alternative versions of a crime. 
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of another,” should be read to mean “the body of a human 
being as distinguished from the mind.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1686 (1993).  For these reasons, we 
conclude that knowingly mailing a communication 
threatening to injure the person of the addressee or of another 
necessarily threatens the use of physical force.  Thus, 
§ 876(c) qualifies as a crime of violence, as defined by 
Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(1).7 
 Chapman’s counterargument can be summarized as 
follows:  “The threat of physically injuring [a] [v]ictim, even 
[the] threat of serious bodily injury or death, does not 
necessarily require a threat to use violent force against the 
person of [the] [v]ictim.”  Appellant’s Br. at 12 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For support, he points to a body of 
                                                 
 7 We are not the first court to conclude that § 876(c) is 
a felony crime of violence.  The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits have all reached the same conclusion.  United 
States v. Guevara, 408 F.3d 252, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that § 876(c)—violated by defendant mailing a 
letter to a federal judge containing a threat and a substance 
mimicking anthrax (also known as an “anthrax hoax”)—is a 
crime of violence); United States v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3d 
766, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Weddle, 
30 F.3d 532, 538 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that § 876(c) 
—violated by defendant mailing a threatening letter to a man 
having an affair with defendant’s wife—is a crime of 
violence); United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 649 
(8th Cir. 1990) (concluding § 876(c) —violated by defendant 




law from other circuits addressing criminal threat statutes8 
and presents four imaginative hypotheticals.  In essence, 
Chapman argues that the threatened use of physical force 
requires striking a person; thus, indirect applications of harm 
                                                 
 8 Appellant’s Br. at 12–13 (citing United States v. 
Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 625 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th 
Cir. 2005)).   
 We are mindful that courts tasked with determining 
whether violations of state criminal threat statutes constitute 
crimes of violence have distinguished between crimes that 
require the “use of force” and those that merely require a 
“result of injury.”  See, e.g., Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d at 167, 
169 (holding that an offense accomplished by “willfully 
threaten[ing] to commit a crime which will result in death or 
great bodily injury” did not “contain an element requiring the 
use or threatened use of physical force” (first quote from Cal. 
Penal Code § 422(a))); Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d at 1286–87 
(holding that an offense accomplished by “knowingly or 
recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another person or with 
criminal negligence . . . caus[ing] bodily injury to another 
person by means of a deadly weapon” does not “necessarily 
include the use or threatened use of ‘physical force’” (first 
quote from Colo Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-204)).  This 
distinction is inapposite to our analysis because of the 
principle we derive from Castleman. 
 Additionally, Chapman’s comparison fails to the 
extent he compares 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) to a statute with a 
mens rea that is less than “knowingly.”   
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fall outside of the Guidelines’ ambit.9  We disagree for two 
reasons. 
 First, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in 
Castleman.  See 134 S. Ct. at 1415.  And taken to its logical 
conclusion, Chapman’s argument allows no room for murder 
or voluntary manslaughter to qualify as crimes of violence 
because both offenses can be committed without the 
perpetrator striking the victim.  This would substantially 
undermine Congress’s goal of imposing “substantial prison 
terms” on “repeat violent offenders.”  Guidelines Manual 
§ 4B1.1 cmt. background.   
 Second, Chapman mistakenly assumes that there is a 
minimum quantum of force necessary to satisfy Johnson’s 
definition of “physical force.”  The Supreme Court in 
Johnson held that the “slightest offensive touching” does not 
qualify as “physical force”—that is it.  See 559 U.S. at 139; 
United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(determining that the Court in Johnson did not construe the 
ACCA “to require that a particular quantum of force be 
employed or threatened to satisfy its physical force 
requirement”).  We can be sure that a threat to harm or to 
                                                 
 9 At oral argument, Chapman’s counsel argued for the 
first time that reputational harm could satisfy the “threat to 
injure the person” of the victim element of § 876(c).  This 
was another attempt to demonstrate that this element sweeps 
broader than the Guidelines definition of “crime of violence.”  
However, we consider this argument waived and abandoned 
because Chapman did “not pursue[] [it] in the argument 




wound the body of another is not akin to a threat to touch 
offensively. 
 Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), which requires 
knowingly mailing a communication containing a threat to 
injure the person of the addressee or of another, falls squarely 
within the career offender enhancement’s definition of “crime 
of violence.”  We therefore conclude that the District Court 
correctly applied the career offender enhancement to 
Chapman’s Guidelines range. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction of the District Court. 
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United States v. Shaun Chapman, No. 16-1810  
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I agree with the well-reasoned opinion of my 
colleagues in this case but write separately to express dismay 
at the ever-expanding application of the categorical approach.  
Recently, our Court was asked to apply the categorical 
approach to contemporaneous convictions obtained in a jury 
trial over which the sentencing judge himself had presided.  
United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Although we declined, id., that request indicates the kudzu 
quality of the categorical approach, which seems to be always 
enlarging its territory.  This case does not present a novel 
expansion of the doctrine, but it does highlight a consistently 
troubling feature: its requirement that judges ignore the real 
world.  To appreciate that problem, one need only read the 
excellent concurring opinions of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III in United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 312-19 (4th Cir. 
2016), and Judge Sandra L. Lynch in United States v. Faust, 
853 F.3d 39, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2017).  My concurrence in this 
case is just a “me too” statement of concern. 
 
The categorical approach to assessing the character of 
previous criminal convictions began with the Supreme 
Court’s effort to apply the sentencing enhancement called for 
by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA” or “the Act”).  
Under the Act, criminal defendants are subject to greater 
penalties based on their previous criminal convictions for 
violent felonies or serious drug offenses, regardless of 
whether those predicate offenses were in violation of state or 
federal law.  But, as the Supreme Court observed in Taylor v. 
United States, “the criminal codes of the States define 
[crimes] in many different ways.”  495 U.S. 575, 580 (1990).  
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To avoid inconsistent application of the ACCA based on 
those variances, the Court read into the Act a “categorical 
approach” to the designation of predicate offenses, whereby 
the elements of a relevant state statute are compared to the 
elements of a generic version of the crime as it stood under 
common law.  Id. at 599.  The Taylor Court explicitly 
directed that its approach left no room for courts to look “to 
the particular facts underlying [the] convictions.”  Id. at 600.   
 
In the context of a federal court examining state court 
convictions, that approach has intuitive appeal, particularly 
when a state conviction is old and lacks back-up records to 
provide historical detail.  But, in practice, the approach has 
often made the job of district courts more difficult.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Perez-Silvan, __F.3d__, No. 16-10177, 2017 
WL 2784971, at *7 (9th Cir. June 28, 2017) (Owens, J., 
concurring) (referring to “sentencing adventures more 
complicated than reconstructing the Staff of Ra in the Map 
Room to locate the Well of the Souls”); United States v. 
Mayer, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1095 (D. Or. 2016) (labeling 
the approach “a Byzantine analytical framework”); Murray v. 
United States, No. 15-cv-5720 (RJB), 2015 WL 7313882, at 
*5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2015) (describing the approach as 
“a hopeless tangle”).  Rather than making things more 
straightforward, the categorical approach has caused 
sentencing judges to “simply swap[] factual inquiries for an 
endless gauntlet of abstract legal questions.”  Doctor, 842 
F.3d at 313 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).  And operating at that 
level of abstraction “can lead courts to reach counterintuitive” 
and arbitrary results.  Faust, 853 F.3d at 61 (Lynch, J., 




Some work is needed to bring the categorical approach 
back in line with its original goal – applying sentencing 
enhancements in a sensible and administratively feasible 
fashion.  I believe that the first step to achieving that goal is 
to permit judges, in their discretion, to rely on the facts 
underlying past convictions when those facts are readily 
ascertainable from reliable government records.  See Doctor, 
842 F.3d at 315 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“District Courts 
should be free to apply [the categorical approach] as the 
default inquiry, but should retain the discretion to consider 
the defendant’s actual conduct when it can be clearly derived 
from the record.”).  In the absence of some reform, several 
problems will persist.   
 
First, the categorical approach is often an impediment 
to uniformity.  See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 
2267-88 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the 
Majority decision disqualifies burglary convictions in many 
states from counting as predicate offenses even though 
“Congress indisputably wanted burglary to count” for all 
states).  The Supreme Court identified the categorical 
approach as an answer to the problem of inconsistent 
sentences, but it can lead to the opposite outcome.  For 
example, two defendants who, in their past, independently 
committed identical criminal acts in two different states and 
have essentially the same criminal history will find that the 
applicability of the ACCA to their current cases depends not 
on their past criminal conduct but on the phrasing of the 
different state criminal statutes.  This “arbitrary and 
inequitable result[] … could not have been Congress’ 
intent[.]”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., 




Second, the categorical approach has interfered with 
the ability of courts to ensure that repeat, violent offenders 
receive the most severe sentences.  Judge Wilkinson has 
described how, purely as a function of the categorical 
approach, repeat offenders often avoid sentencing 
enhancements for their violent crimes.  See Doctor, 842 F.3d 
at 315 (Wilkinson, J. concurring) (listing ten cases in which 
violent acts did not categorically qualify as violent felonies).  
Judge Lynch focused on a telling example of how the 
categorical approach forces judges into an alternative reality, 
dictating that assault and battery on a police officer, despite 
common sense and what “[t]he average person on the street 
would ordinarily think[,]” is not categorized as a crime of 
violence.   Faust, 853 F.3d at 60 (Lynch, J., concurring).  
Again, “[i]t could not have been Congress’ intent for a career 
offender to escape his statutorily mandated punishment when 
the record makes it clear beyond any possible doubt that he 
committed [an enumerated felony].”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted).  
 
Third, the categorical approach often asks judges to 
feign amnesia.  It requires them to “peek” at portions of the 
factual record to determine under which division of a statute 
an offender’s past conviction falls.  Id. at 2256 (majority 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).  When that is 
done, a different label – the “modified categorical approach” 
– gets hung on the process, and things are better for that brief 
exposure to reality.  But, after seeing that information, a judge 
is then asked to erase those facts from his or her mind in 
deciding whether the conviction is a violent felony or serious 
drug offense.  Id. at 2256-57.  The judge must ignore facts 
already known and instead proceed with eyes shut.   
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Finally, the categorical approach has led to unusual 
questions of statutory interpretation which have in turn led to 
even more unusual results.  The most troubling example is the 
Supreme Court’s declaration that the “residual clause” of the 
ACCA is unconstitutional.  That clause was a catch-all which 
provided that “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year” that “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another” should be counted as a violent felony.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  In Johnson v. United States, the Court 
held that the clause was unconstitutionally vague because of 
the near impossibility of rationally and consistently applying 
it under the categorical approach.  135 S. Ct. 2551, 2559-60 
(2015).  Over a forceful dissent, the Majority maintained that 
application of the categorical approach was in line with 
Congressional intent.  Id. at 2561-62.   So the Court struck 
down the clause as unconstitutional, rather than reconsidering 
its own analytical construct, the categorical approach.  It is 
not immediately obvious why the judiciary’s difficulty in 
making the categorical approach work should lead to the 
conclusion that Congress and the President strayed from the 
Constitution in enacting the ACCA.     
 
Because the categorical approach often fails to achieve 
the goal it was designed for, and because it is a purely judge-
made doctrine, I join those who have urged that it be given 
reconsideration.  See Faust, 853 F.3d at 60 (Lynch, J., 
concurring); Doctor, 842 F.3d at 315 (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring).  Even a modest fix could remedy the most 
troubling results: where the facts concerning a previous 
conviction are beyond fair dispute, a judge should be 
permitted to consider those facts in applying sentencing 
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enhancements.1  In this case, for instance, the analysis should 
have been no more complicated than this: First, the 
sentencing enhancement provision defines a “crime of 
violence” as “any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
that … has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another[,]”  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); second, Chapman was convicted of a 
crime requiring a “threat to injure [a] person[,]” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 876(c); and third, the record shows unequivocally that he 
did threaten to injure a person.     
 
Forcing judges to close their eyes to what is obvious 
promotes inefficiency and guarantees difficult-to-explain 
sentences.  In the easy cases, we should let our sentencing 
judges work with their eyes open.   
                                              
1 If the facts are not clear, thereby creating a legitimate 
Sixth Amendment argument, see Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13, 24-25 (2005), there is a logical basis for insisting 
on the categorical approach.  See United States v. Robinson, 
844 F.3d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that 
developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence “provide[] 
an additional reason for avoiding factual inquiries”).  
